*Q:* Why did the Democratic party keep losing to President Bush on foreign policy issues even under favorable conditions? *A:* Because it didn’t offer a coherent alternative.
Yglesias justifies a book length answer by providing a history of both the politics and the policy. His preferred alternative is classical liberal internationalism, an attempt to slowly progress towards a rule-based international system. This ideology dates back to Woodrow Wilson but was first implemented with any success under FDR. Containment, deterrence, and the first Gulf War were all compatible with this idea while pre-emptive war is dramatically opposed to it.
Support for this world view began to breakdown during the 1990s as some liberals, including myself, grew frustrated with the failures of the international community to prevent genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda. For the war in Kosovo the U.S. skirted U.N. approval and instead went to Nato to get multilateral support. After 9/11 key liberal hawks started treating a rule-based order as an instrument rather than a goal, pursuing international support was wise but even if the U.N. or a major regional organization did not sign on, a pre-emptive war could still be justified.
Yglesias argues that in 2002 and 2004 Democrats often sought to neutralize foreign policy issues either by supporting the President’s policies, critiquing on their implementation, or by pinning our hopes on military veteran candidates. By 2006 Democratic opponents of the war were finally in ascendancy but many liberals in the foreign policy community and the press still hew to the hawk line. Despite popular support for withdraw, Congress has been repeatedly thwarted in part because they have focused on tactical critiques rather than strategic ones. Since tactics and implementation are easy to change, and in some cases have changed for the better, the administration has consistently been able to out maneuver that charge. It may prove even weaker against John McCain who has supported many administration policies but still will have an easier time isolating himself from the President’s personal incompetence.
More after the cut
After reading the history, I think the political analysis definitely holds up. To add a political analogy that Yglesias doesn’t use, I think Democratic abandonment of the field on foreign policy is a bit like Clinton’s decision not to contest many of the post-Super Tuesday states. As a result, she lost them by a bigger margin than she would have which hurt her since the primaries are proportional. Issues aren’t binary, you can’t just write one off as a loss. Similarly, I think his analysis would actually hold if you believed that the Democrats should be realist instead of liberal internationalist. The only real weakness in support is the lack of quantitative backup. While the book discusses many election results, it would be interesting to see how well out-of-Iraq coalition Democrats fared vs. other party candidates. There’s obviously a lot of potential confounds in such a study, but I think there’s many established procedures for facing them.
In addition to the history, Yglesias shines in defining worldviews. First he easily but thoroughly counters the idea that George W. Bush, even before 9/11, was an isolationist. The administration has consistently kept defense spending far higher than real isolationists like Pat Buchanan would advocate. His withdrawal from treaty regimes was not based on a desire to withdrawal from the world but instead a desire to remove all restraints on American power. Similarly, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld unlike Paul Wolfowitz really don’t follow neo-conservative nominal concern with democracy building. Instead Yglesias types the administrations overall outlook an older American philosophy dating back to the nationalism of Andrew Jackson. This philosophy is epitomized in a statement from the 2005 National Defense Strategy: "[O]ur strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism." For the full analysis you’ll have to read the book, but I think that typing holds up.
Liberal internationalism is similarly well defined. The core tenants are positive-sum negotiations, rules that apply even to the U.S., and efforts to understand the perspectives of other countries. Liberal internationals work through the U.N., regional organizations, or other treaty bodies as appropriate. This outlook calls for a withdrawal from Iraq and no more preventive wars (e.g. Iran). He does call for working with allies to expand targeted sanctions against Iran but at the same time argues that we need to offer a nonproliferation deal that is more appealing to non-nuclear nations.
This is not a philosophy dependent on new ideas or tools. In fact, Yglesias strongly rejects the possibility of an Alliance of Democracies if that organization is meant to provide an alternate source of legitimacy for interventions. He is supportive of democracy building efforts but think that they require existing credible grassroots organizations in the country and thus have a practical limit of about one billion dollars a year. This does not mean that the book dismisses the existence of new problems but it instead argues the liberal internationalist approach already has the tools needed to solve them. The power of the U.S. is multifaceted, we carry a great deal of weight in the military sphere but despite a weakened reputation can apply that power equally well to achieve diplomatic victories.
Finally, while Heads in the Sand is a complete argument, I think there are two areas outside of the book’s scope that would also be quite suitable for longer-form analysis. First, the book elides some potential faults within the liberal internationalist camp. The disagreements go back to Kosovo which in other venues Yglesias has treated it as legitimate but considers it a bad model for the future. Kevin Drum, operating from within the liberal internationalist tradition, demurs and offers support for Kosovo that I personally find compelling. However, Heads in the Sand is a coalition building book and we can handle debates within liberal internationalism elsewhere.
The second issue the book does not really cover is how to improve the civilian foreign policy tools of the U.S. government. A few of these potential tools, such as the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization are mentioned in passing as potentially useful but less important than an overall strategic shift. If this country moves back towards liberal internationalism, we will still be left with new problems not envisioned by post-WWII institutions: notably failed states and increased perception of threats to civilians implementing U.S. foreign policy in the field. In addition, many of our civilian efforts are scattered and at times disfuncional as I intend to cover in an upcoming post on a Gordon Adams. Yglesias’s reasonable view seems to be that these issues are secondary to the larger strategic questions and might distract us from more immediate concerns such as withdrawal from Iraq.
On the whole I found this an excellent and compelling book that was well worth buying. It’s been the first of the big think foreign policy books and articles that got me to change how I classify myself. Even so I think it’s quite accessible and worth reading for the lay reader interesting in foreign policy and the related politics but not excited by theory.
Interesting review. I'll have to consider getting this at some point. It's been a while since I've read this sort of book, but that could just mean I'm due.
Posted by: Moti | May 12, 2008 at 11:13 AM
If you want an autographed copy I can pick you one up tomorrow. Up to you whether the hassle of getting it through the mail is worth the autograph.
Posted by: Greg Sanders | May 12, 2008 at 12:06 PM
It's unlikely I would read it within the next two months, so I could probably just pick it up when I'm down there in July with no ill effects. That assumes you wouldn't mind holding it for that long, of course. I can Paypal you the cost of the book, no problems; just let me know how much it costs. Thanks!
Posted by: Moti | May 12, 2008 at 03:50 PM