So there’s a new proposal on how to revamp the War Powers act, which gives Congress a mechanism to force withdrawals under certain condition but that is a mechanism that Congress has never used. In any event a proposal to fix it seems fairly worthless as enforcing the act would require overcoming a veto. If you can overcome a veto you already can basically do what you want, why do you need a war powers act?
Timothy Noah also picked up on this and provides some explanation as to why this whole area is so messed up: Congress doesn’t want that responsibility. He cites a historical example.
What amazed and shocked me, and moved me to write up the debate for the New Republic, was the unembarrassed manner in which members of Congress declared as their paramount interest the absence of any legislative fingerprints on whatever might result from allowing (or not allowing) the Navy convoys to enter an area of violent conflict. In fact, it was pretty much taken as a given that the War Powers Resolution would not be invoked, not because the president was not complying with it (no president ever has) but because doing so would require Congress to either approve or revoke Reagan’s decision.
If he’s right, we’ve got a structural flaw in the Constitution. We need a Congress willing to actually exercise or deny the ability to declare war. Absent that, we need an alternate check to ensure accountability for one of the executive branches most dangerous powers. The only alternative I’m coming up with is a no confidence vote as an alternate means to impeachment of removing a president.
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