I'm generally a fan of Slate military Analyst Fred Kaplan, but I think he misses an option in his recent article "Has Karzai Gone Crazy?" First, here's his accurate summary of recent news:
On April 1, [Afghan President Hamid Karzai] accused the West of trying to rig last fall's Afghan presidential elections (which, in fact, he had so blatantly rigged himself) and criticized the Western military coalition (which is all that's separating him from a rope and a lamp post) as invaders who are legitimizing the Taliban as a movement of "national resistance."
When it was clear that the objects of his attack were not amused, Karzai phoned Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to apologize for any misunderstandings that his remarks might have caused. Then, over the weekend, he escalated the rhetoric… [And so on]
Given the criticality of local government efforts to a counterinsurgency, this is obviously deeply disturbing. Kaplan argues, reasonably, that President Karzai thinks that we needs and thus he can do what he wants. One common proposal is to try working at the provincial level:
Gerard Russell, a former U.N. official in Kabul (who is now at Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy), said in a phone interview Monday that the Western coalition is pursuing this approach to some extent. The ongoing military operation in Helmand province has elevated the power of some independent Afghans there, at the expense of Karzai's people.
However, Russell added, there are risks to going around Karzai as the centerpiece of a strategy. "Karzai is very good at this sort of thing," Russell said. "He could undermine these regional governors if they get too powerful."
I'd like a bit of elaboration here. It seems to me as if given that the government revenue comes from the West, shifting distribution to a provincial level rather than reorganizing the way it flows down from the central government would be a way to deal with this problem. On the other hand, this would leave the coalition effectively playing the part of the central government of a confederal system and if that's a model that might work in Afghanistan that's not a role that appeals to me.
Kaplan concludes:
It is now clearer than ever that the strategy's success or failure is, in large measure, up to Karzai. If he hasn't proved to be a reliable partner by [the end of 2010] then, it's time for us to back someone else—or leave.
I don't think backing another Afghan President is a practical option, impeachment issues aside. President Karzai's last win was nebulous, his main opponent isn't of the majority ethnic group, and any replacement is likely to come in with less legitimacy then the fairly low level the President enjoys at the moment. We don't need to replace the man, we need a new institution. The Afghan Parliament has been pushing back against the President, Joshua Partlow reports that the lower house, the Wolesi Jira, recently defeated his proposal to take additional control over investigations of voter fraud after earlier in the year rejecting many of his cabinet nominees. Flowing funding through Parliament would not necessarily sideline President Karzai but it would mean that the President, or any emerging Parliamentary leadership, would be dependent on Afghan coalition-building and not their relationship with U.S. and European leadership.
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