Speaking for myself here, you know the drill.
My last post was fairly critical of the President's announcement, and I'm now satisfied that the critiques have been thoroughly covered. Similarly, the flaws in the legal rationale are being well reported. Thankfully these critiques have included debunking of some of the alarmist rhetoric, done here by a one-time colleague I admire;
Daniel Benjamin, who served as the State Department’s top counterterrorism adviser during Mr. Obama’s first term, said the public discussion about the ISIS threat has been a “farce,” with “members of the cabinet and top military officers all over the place describing the threat in lurid terms that are not justified.”
As disturbing as I find threat inflation by the administration, it's important to remember that the context is relentless alarmism from hawks, primarily in the opposition but not limited to that. So let me start with praising the way the President has handled Iraq. Marc Lynch discusses the details:
Obama did very well by acting to prevent the fall of Erbil or Baghdad, while conditioning additional U.S. military support on political change. He correctly understood that military aid prior to Maliki’s departure would simply enable his destructive, sectarian style of rule which played a key role in both the revival of the Iraqi Sunni insurgency, with ISIS as its vanguard, and the stunning collapse of the Iraqi army. His replacement by Haider al-Abadi, a similar Shia Islamist that has nevertheless committed to forming a more representative polity in Baghdad, was a necessary, but not sufficient, step to begin the engagement of deeply alienated Sunnis. U.S. diplomats must be prepared for the real risk that Iraqi politicians will revert to their destructive, self-interested and sectarian ways once the existential threat recedes.
This is one example of what it means to say that a problem doesn't have a military solution. There is a common phenomenon in legislative politics where final passage is preceded by a crisis and only when passage is imperiled can various members be convinced to stop free-riding and compromise their demands. Those that followed Iraq widely knew that P.M. Maliki was bad news, but it was only possible to push him out once it became clear that we would not be bailing him out. Unfortunately the challenge in Syria is just as political but even larger, increasing the unity, not just the firepower, of the opposition. Again, here's Marc Lynch with the Center for A New American Security's tourniquet strategy:
The immediate goal in Syria should be the securing of a strategic pause between the rebel forces and the regime in order to focus military efforts on ISIS. Crucially, this strategic pause does not mean cooperation or alignment with Asad, or a retreat from the Geneva Accord principles of a political transition. It should be understood instead as buying the time to shape an environment in which such a transition could become plausible. As the administration clearly recognizes, an alliance with Asad against ISIS would cause more problems than it solves. Even setting aside the moral objections to aligning with a regime responsible for large-scale war crimes, working with Asad would almost certainly drive horrified opposition fighters and civilians toward ISIS and critically divide the regional coalition. There is little chance at the moment of his overthrow by force at any rate, however. Indeed, like Slobodon Milosevic in the Balkan wars, Asad is less likely to survive a de-escalated but internationally penetrated political landscape than he is to cling to power against Syria’s insurgency.
The longer-term goal should be to translate this anti-ISIS tacit accord into an effective agreement by the external backers of both Asad and the rebels on a de-escalation of the conflict. Rather than a military drive on Damascus, the international community should build upon UN Resolution 2165 authorizing cross-border aid to support the delivery of serious humanitarian relief, security and governance to rebel controlled areas and refugees. And it should build upon UN Resolution 2170 sanctioning ISIS and focus upon the joint restriction of the flow of funds and fighters to all sides of the Syria conflict. Asad will not voluntarily agree to such an accord, of course, and would seek every opportunity to disrupt the process.
This aligns with what I've read of the political science (here's Dan Drezner's summary). This will be challenging, as the results of the air campaign will not give results that will be satisfying in the short term. I have critiqued the administration before and will again, but I think they are making a bigger picture strategic mistake by what Drezner calls "the consolidation of policy authority inside the White House." Part of this is just that the President's comparatively less interventionist instincts leaves him somewhat isolated in the policymaking community. However, this is a self-defeating response. Consolidating control reduces the pool of talent you can call upon and might help you in a single area - say the vital negotiations with Iran - but hurts you elsewhere. By comparison, respecting Congress's constitutional role in matters of war would add a veto point and force critics in the legislature to actually participate in the governing process rather than just pontificating. The downside - fewer interventions when the President does have a case - is manageable and looks appealing when you survey the Presidential field for 2016.
Strategic critique aside, successfully implementing the tourniquet strategy demands avoiding mission creep. To take an earlier wise comment from Sam Brannen, a current colleague I admire:
Much now remains up to the Iraqis, from the hard fighting on the ground to political reconciliation. And the White House must craft its Iraq strategy on the fly, reacting to a highly fluid environment, balancing doing too little or too much and always risking mission creep or mission failure. But so far, the use of force by the United States has shown strength in a part of the world where, unfortunately, the tip of the spear is the coin of the realm.
Military force is a coin of the realm in the Middle East, not because of intrinsic cultural characteristics so much as the fact that it always accompanies great power competition and widespread autocracy (or unconsolidated democracy). But to extend the metaphor, other powers will always be happy to have you spend your coin on their behalf but that doesn't make it good strategy. As a final note, to take one lesson from my classes in negotiation and past trips to China and Egypt, you haven't begun bargaining until you've threatened to walk away. That's not a lesson one should apply to marriages or treaty alliances, but thankfully in the Persian Gulf we're dealing with neither.
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